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Abstract Until recently, social media were seen to pro-
mote democratic discourse on social and political issues.
However, this powerful communication ecosystem has
come under scrutiny for allowing hostile actors to ex-
ploit online discussions in an attempt to manipulate
public opinion. A case in point is the ongoing U.S.
Congress investigation of Russian interference in the
2016 U.S. election campaign, with Russia accused of,
among other things, using trolls (malicious accounts
created for the purpose of manipulation) and bots (au-
tomated accounts) to spread propaganda and politically
biased information. In this study, we explore the effects
of this manipulation campaign, taking a closer look at
users who re-shared the posts produced on Twitter by
the Russian troll accounts publicly disclosed by U.S.
Congress investigation. We collected a dataset of 13 mil-
lion election-related posts shared on Twitter in the year
of 2016 by over a million distinct users. This dataset in-
cludes accounts associated with the identified Russian
trolls as well as users sharing posts in the same time
period on a variety of topics around the 2016 elections.
We use label propagation to infer the users’ ideology
based on the news sources they share. We are able to
classify a large number of the users as liberal or con-
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servative with precision and recall above 84%. Conser-
vative users who retweet Russian trolls produced sig-
nificantly more tweets than liberal ones, about 8 times
as many in terms of tweets. Additionally, trolls’ po-
sition in the retweet network is stable overtime, un-
like users who retweet them who form the core of the
election-related retweet network by the end of 2016.
Using state-of-the-art bot detection techniques, we es-
timate that about 5% and 11% of liberal and conser-
vative users are bots, respectively. Text analysis on the
content shared by trolls reveal that conservative trolls
talk about refugees, terrorism, and Islam; while liberal
trolls talk more about school shootings and the police.
Although an ideologically broad swath of Twitter users
were exposed to Russian trolls in the period leading
up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, it is mainly
conservatives who help amplify their message.
Keywords Social media manipulation · Russian
trolls · Bots · Influence campaigns
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1 Introduction
Social media have helped foster democratic conversa-
tion about social and political issues: from the Arab
Spring Gonza´lez-Bailo´n et al. (2011), to Occupy Wall
Street movements Conover et al. (2013a,b) and other
civil protests Gonza´lez-Bailo´n et al. (2013); Stella et al.
(2018); Varol et al. (2014), Twitter and other social
media platforms appeared to play an instrumental role
in involving the public in policy and political conver-
sations by collectively framing the narratives related
to particular social issues, and coordinating online and
off-line activities. The use of digital media for politi-
cal discussions during presidential elections is examined
by many studies, including the past four U.S. Presi-
dential elections Adamic and Glance (2005); Bekafigo
and McBride (2013); Carlisle and Patton (2013); Di-
akopoulos and Shamma (2010); DiGrazia et al. (2013),
and other countries like Australia Bruns and Burgess
(2011); Gibson and McAllister (2006), and Norway Enli
and Skogerbø (2013). Findings that focus on the pos-
itive effects of social media, such as increasing voter
turnout Bond et al. (2012) or exposure to diverse polit-
ical views Bakshy et al. (2015) contribute to the general
praise of these platforms as a tool for promoting democ-
racy and civic engagement Effing et al. (2011); Loader
and Mercea (2011); Shirky (2011); Tufekci (2014); Tufekci
and Wilson (2012).
However, concerns regarding the possibility of ma-
nipulating public opinion and spreading political pro-
paganda or fake news through social media were also
raised early on Howard (2006). These effects are doc-
umented by several studies Bessi and Ferrara (2016);
Conover et al. (2011a); El-Khalili (2013); Ferrara (2017);
Fourney et al. (2017); Ratkiewicz et al. (2011a); Shorey
and Howard (2016); Woolley and Howard (2016). So-
cial media have been proven to be an effective tool to
influence individuals’ opinions and behaviors Aral and
Walker (2012); Aral et al. (2009); Bakshy et al. (2011);
Centola (2010, 2011) and some studies even evaluate
the current tools to combat misinformation Pennycook
and Rand (????). Computational tools, like troll ac-
counts and social bots, have been designed to perform
such type of influence operations at scale, by cloning or
emulating the activity of human users while operating
at much higher pace (e.g., automatically producing con-
tent following a scripted agenda) Ferrara (2018); Fer-
rara et al. (2016b); Hwang et al. (2012); Messias et al.
(2013); Varol et al. (2017b) – however, it should be
noted that bots have been also used, in some instances,
for positive interventions Monsted et al. (2017); Savage
et al. (2016).
Early accounts of the adoption of bots to attempt
manipulate political communication with misinforma-
tion started in 2010, during the U.S. midterm elections,
when social bots were employed to support some candi-
dates and smear others; in that instance, bots injected
thousands of tweets pointing to Web sites with fake
news Ratkiewicz et al. (2011b). Similar cases are re-
ported during the 2010 Massachusetts special election
Metaxas and Mustafaraj (2012) – these campaigns are
often referred to as Twitter bombs, or political astro-
turf Ferrara et al. (2016a); Varol et al. (2017a). Un-
fortunately, oftentimes determining the actors behind
these operations was impossible Ferrara et al. (2016b);
Kollanyi et al. (2016). Prior to this work, only a hand-
ful of other operations are linked to some specific ac-
tors Woolley and Howard (2016), e.g., the alt-right at-
tempt to smear a presidential candidate before the 2017
French election Ferrara (2017). This is because gov-
ernments, organizations, and other entities with suffi-
cient resources, can obtain the technological capabilities
necessary to covertly deploy hundreds or thousands of
accounts and use them to either support or attack a
given political target. Reverse-engineering these strate-
gies has proven a challenging research venue Alarifi
et al. (2016); Davis et al. (2016); Freitas et al. (2015);
Subrahmanian et al. (2016), but it can ultimately lead
to techniques to identify the actors behind these oper-
ations.
One difficulty facing such studies is objectively de-
termining what is fake news, as there is a range of un-
truthfulness from simple exaggeration to outright lies.
Beyond factually wrong information, it is difficult to
classify information as fake.
Rather than facing the conundrum of normative judg-
ment and arbitrarily determine what is fake news and
what is not, in this study we focus on user intents,
specifically the intent to deceive, and their effects on
the Twitter political conversation prior to the 2016 U.S.
Presidential election.
Online accounts that are created and operated with
the primary goal of manipulating public opinion (for
example, promoting divisiveness or conflict on some so-
cial or political issue) are commonly known as Inter-
net trolls (trolls, in short) Buckels et al. (2014). To la-
bel some accounts or sources of information as trolls,
a clear intent to deceive or create conflict has to be
present. A malicious intent to harm the political pro-
cess and cause distrust in the political system was ev-
ident in 2,752 now-deactivated Twitter accounts that
are later identified as being tied to Russia’s “Internet
Research Agency” troll farm, which was also active on
Facebook Dutt et al. (2018). The U.S. Congress released
a list of these accounts as part of the official investi-
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gation of Russian efforts to interfere in the 2016 U.S.
Presidential election.
Since their intent is clearly malicious, the Russian
Troll accounts and their messages are the subject of our
scrutiny: we study their spread on Twitter to under-
stand the extent of the Russian interference effort and
its effects on the election-related political discussion.
1.1 Research Questions
In this paper, we aim to answer three crucial research
questions regarding the effects of the interference oper-
ation carried out by Russian trolls:
RQ1 What is the role of the users’ political ideology?. We
investigate whether political ideology affects who
engages with Russian trolls, and how that may have
helped propagate trolls’ content. If that is the case,
we will determine if the effect is more pronounced
among liberals or conservatives, or evenly spread
across the political spectrum.
RQ2 How central are the trolls in the network of spread-
ing information in the year of 2016 (pre and post-the
US presidential elections)? We offer analyses of the
position of trolls and the users who spread their mes-
sages in the retweet network progressively in time
from the beginning of 2016 to the end of that year.
RQ3 What is the role of social bots? We characterize
whether social bots play a role in spreading content
produced by Russian trolls and, if that was the case,
where on the political spectrum are bots situated.
RQ4 Do trolls succeed in specific areas of the US?. We of-
fer an extensive analysis of the geospatial dimension
and how it affects the effectiveness of the Russian in-
terference operation; we test whether users located
within specific states participate in the consumption
and propagation of trolls’ content more than others.
This paper improves upon our previous work Badawy
et al. (2018) by 1) extending the span of the data to
one year before and after the 2016 US elections rather
than just two months as in the previous paper; 2) using
sophisticated network analysis to understand the influ-
ence of malicious users across time. We collect Twit-
ter data for a year leading into the election. We ob-
tained a dataset of over 13 million tweets generated by
over a million distinct users in the year of 2016. We
successfully determine the political ideology of most of
the users using label propagation on the retweet net-
work with precision and recall exceeding 84%. Next,
using advanced machine learning techniques developed
to discover social bots Davis et al. (2016); Ferrara et al.
(2016b); Subrahmanian et al. (2016) applied on users
who engage with Russian trolls, we find that bots ex-
isted among both liberal and conservative users. We
perform text analysis on the content Russian trolls dis-
seminated, and find that conservative trolls are con-
cerned with particular causes, such as refugees, terror-
ism and Islam, while liberal trolls write about issues re-
lated to the police and school shootings. Additionally,
we offer an extensive geospatial analysis of tweets across
the United States, showing that it is mostly propor-
tionate to the states’ population size—as expected—
however, a few outliers emerge for both liberals and
conservatives.
1.2 Summary of Contributions
Findings presented in this work can be summarized as:
– We propose a novel way of measuring the consump-
tion of manipulated content through the analysis of
activities of Russian trolls on Twitter in the year of
2016.
– Using network-based machine learning methods, we
accurately determine the political ideology of most
users in our dataset, with precision and recall above
84%.
– We use network analysis to map the position of trolls
and spreaders in the retweet network over the year
of 2016.
– State-of-the-art bot detection on users who engage
with Russian trolls shows that bots are engaged in
both liberal and conservative domains.
– Text analysis shows that conservative Russian trolls
are mostly promoting conservative causes in regards
to refugees, terrorism, and Islam as well as talk-
ing about Trump, Clinton, and Obama. For liberal
trolls, the discussion is focused on school shootings
and the police, but Trump and Clinton are in the
top words used as well.
– We offer a comprehensive geospatial analysis show-
ing that certain states overly-engaged with produc-
tion and diffusion of Russian trolls’ contents.
2 Data Collection
2.1 Twitter Dataset
2.1.1 Trolls
To collect Twitter data about the Russian trolls, we
use a list of 2,752 Twitter accounts identified as Rus-
sian trolls that is compiled and released by the U.S.
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Russian trolls.
Value
# of Russian trolls 2,735
# of trolls in our data 1,148
# of trolls wrote original tweets 1,032
# of original tweets 538,166
Congress.1 To collect the tweets, we use Crimson Hexagon,2
a social media analytic platform that provides paid
datastream access. This tool allows us to obtain tweets
and retweets produced by trolls and subsequently deleted
in the year of 2016. Table 1 offers some descriptive
statistics of the Russian troll accounts. Out of the ac-
counts appearing on the list, 1,148 accounts exist in the
dataset, and a little over a thousand of them produce
more than half a million of original tweets.
We also collect users that did not retweet any troll,
since it helps us have a better understanding of trolls
behaviour online vs. normal users and how it affects
the overall discourse on Twitter. We collect non-trolls’
tweets using two strategies. First, we collect tweets of
such users using a list of hashtags and keywords that
relate to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. This list is
crafted to contain a roughly equal number of hashtags
and keywords associated with each major Presidential
candidate: we select 23 terms, including five terms refer-
ring to the Republican Party nominee Donald J. Trump
(#donaldtrump, #trump2016, #neverhillary, #trump-
pence16, #trump), four terms for Democratic Party
nominee Hillary Clinton (#hillaryclinton, #imwithher,
#nevertrump, #hillary), and several terms related to
debates. To make sure our query list was comprehen-
sive, we add a few keywords for the two third-party
candidates, including the Libertarian Party nominee
Gary Johnson (one term), and Green Party nominee
Jill Stein (two terms).Our second strategy is to collect
tweets from the same users that do not include the same
key terms mentioned above.
Table 2 reports some aggregate statistics of the data.
It shows that the number of retweets and tweets with
URLs are quite high, more than 3/4 of the dataset.
Figure 1 shows the timeline of the tweets’ volme and
the users who produced these tweets in the 2016 with
a spike around the time of the election.
2.2 Classification of Media Outlets
We classify users by their ideology based on the political
leaning of the media outlets they share. The classifica-
1 https://www.recode.net/2017/11/2/16598312/russia-
twitter-trump-twitter-deactivated-handle-list
2 https://www.crimsonhexagon.com/
Fig. 1 Timeline of the volume of tweets (in blue) generated
during our observation period and users the produced these
tweets (in red).
Table 2 Twitter Data Descriptive Statistics.
Statistic Count
# of Tweets 13,631,266
# of Retweets 10,556,421
# of Distinct Users 1,089,974
# of Tweets/Retweets with a URL 10,621,071
tion algorithm is described in Section 3.2. In this sec-
tion, We describe the methodology of obtaining ground
truth labels for the media outlets.
We use lists of partisan media outlets compiled by
third-party organizations, such as AllSides3 and Me-
dia Bias/Fact Check.4 We combine liberal and liberal-
center media outlets into one list and conservative and
conservative-center into another. The combined list in-
cludes 641 liberal and 398 conservative outlets. How-
ever, in order to cross reference these media URLs with
the URLs in the Twitter dataset, we need to get the
long URLs for most of the links in the dataset, since
most of them are shortened. As this process is quite
time-consuming, we get the top 5,000 URLs by count
and then retrieve the long version for those. These top
5,000 URLs accounts for more than 2.1 million or around
1/5 of the URLs in the dataset.
After cross-referencing the 5,000 long URLs with
the media URLs, we observe that 7,912 tweets in the
dataset contain a URL that points to one of the liberal
media outlets and 29,846 tweets with a URL point-
ing to one of the conservative media outlets. Figure
2 shows the distributions of tweets with URLs from
3 https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/
media-bias-ratings
4 https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
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Table 3 Liberal & Conservative Domain Names (excluding
left-center and right-center)
Liberal Conservative
change.org dailycaller.com
cnn.com nypost.com
dailykos.com americanthinker.com
democracynow.org bizpacreview.com
huffingtonpost.com breitbart.com
nydailynews.com dailymail.co.u
rawstory.com judicialwatch.org
rollingstone.com nationalreview.com
thedailybeast.com thegatewaypundit.com
theroot.com
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the Retweet Network.
Statstic Count
# of nodes 1,407,190
# of edges 4,874,786
Max in-degree 198,262
Max out-degree 8,458
Density 2.46e-06
liberal and conservative outlets. As we can see in the
figures, American Thinker dominated the URLs being
shared in the conservative sample under study, while
in the liberal sample more media outlets were equally
represented. Table 3 shows the list of the left and right
media outlets/domain names after removing left/right
center from the list.
We use a polarity rule to label Twitter users as lib-
eral or conservative depending on the number of tweets
they produce with links to liberal or conservative sources.
In other words, if a user has more tweets with URLs
to liberal sources, he/she is labeled as liberal and vice
versa. Although the overwhelming majority of users in-
clude URLs that are either liberal or conservative, we
remove any users that has equal number of tweets from
each side. Our final set of labeled users includes 10,074
users.
3 Methods and Data Analysis
3.1 Retweet Network
We construct a retweet network, containing nodes (Twit-
ter users) with a directed link between them if one user
retweet a post of another. Table 4 shows the descriptive
statistics of the retweet network. It is a sparse network
with a giant component that includes 1,357,493 nodes.
Table 5 Precision & Recall scores on seed users
Seed Users
Precision 0.84
Recall 0.84
3.2 Label Propagation
We use label propagation5 to classify Twitter accounts
as liberal or conservative, similar to prior work Conover
et al. (2011b). In a network-based label propagation
algorithm each node is assigned a label, which is up-
dated iteratively based on the labels of node’s network
neighbors. In label propagation, a node takes the most
frequent label of its neighbors as its own new label.
The algorithm proceeds updating labels iteratively and
stops when the labels no longer change (see Raghavan
et al. (2007) for more information). The algorithm takes
as parameters (i) weights, in-degree or how many times
node i retweets node j; (ii) seeds (the list of labeled
nodes). We fix the seeds’ labels so they do not change
in the process, since this seed list also serves as our
ground truth.
We construct a retweet network where each node
corresponds to a Twitter account and a link exists be-
tween pairs of nodes when one of them retweets a mes-
sage posted by the other. We use more than 10,000 users
mentioned in the media outlets sections as seeds – those
who mainly retweet messages from either the liberal or
the conservative media outlets in Figure 2 – and label
them accordingly. We then run label propagation to la-
bel the remaining nodes in the retweet network.
To validate results of the label propagation algo-
rithm, we apply stratified cross (5-fold) validation to
the set of more than 10,000 seeds. We train the algo-
rithm on 4/5 of the seed list and see how it performs on
the remaining 1/5. The precision and recall scores are
around 0.84. Since we combine liberal and liberal-center
into one list (same for conservatives), we can see that
the algorithm is not only labeling the far liberal or con-
servative correctly, which is a relatively easier task, but
it is performing well on the liberal/conservative center
as well.
3.3 Bot Detection
Determining whether either a human or a bot con-
trols a social media account has proven a very chal-
lenging task Ferrara et al. (2016b); Kudugunta and
Ferrara (2018); Subrahmanian et al. (2016). We use
5 We use the algorithm in the Python version of the Igraph
library Csardi and Nepusz (2006)
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Fig. 2 Distribution of tweets with links to liberal (right) and conservative (left) media outlets.
an openly accessible solution called Botometer (a.k.a.
BotOrNot) Davis et al. (2016), consisting of both a
public Web site (https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/)
and a Python API (https://github.com/IUNetSci/
botometer-python), which allows for making this de-
termination with high accuracy. Botometer is a machine-
learning framework that extracts and analyses a set of
over one thousand features, spanning six sub classes:
User: Meta-data features that include the number of
friends and followers, the number of tweets produced
by the users,profile description and settings.
Friends: Four types of links are considered here: retweet-
ing, mentioning, being retweeted, and being men-
tioned. For each group separately, botometer ex-
tracts features about language use, local time, pop-
ularity, etc.
Network: Botometer reconstructs three types of net-
works: retweet, mention, and hashtag co-occurrence
networks. All networks are weighted according to
the frequency of interactions or co-occurrences.
Temporal: Features related to user activity, including
average rates of tweet production over various time
periods and distributions of time intervals between
events.
Content: Statistics about length and entropy of tweet
text and Part-of-Speech (POS) tagging techniques,
which identifies different types of natural language
components, or POS tags.
Sentiment: Features such as: arousal, valence and dom-
inance scores Warriner et al. (2013), happiness score
Kloumann et al. (2012), polarization and strength
Wilson et al. (2005), and emotion score Agarwal
et al. (2011).
Botometer is trained with thousands of instances of
social bots, from simple to sophisticated, yielding an
accuracy above 95 percent Davis et al. (2016). Typi-
cally, Botometer returns likelihood scores above 50 per-
cent only for accounts that look suspicious to a scrupu-
lous analysis. We adopted the Python Botometer API
to systematically inspect the most active users in our
dataset. The Python Botometer API queries the Twit-
ter API to extract 300 recent tweets and publicly avail-
able account metadata, and feeds these features to an
ensemble of machine learning classifiers, which produce
a bot score. To label accounts as bots, we use the fifty-
percent threshold – which has proven effective in prior
studies Davis et al. (2016): an account is considered to
be a bot if the overall Botometer score is above 0.5.
3.4 Geolocation
There are two ways to identity the location of tweets
produced by users. One way is to collect the coordinates
of the location the tweets were sent from; however, this
is only possible if users enable the geolocation option
on their Twitter accounts. The second way is to analyze
the self-reported location text in users’ profiles. The lat-
ter includes substantially more noise, since many peo-
ple write fictitious or imprecise locations – for example,
they may identify the state and the country they reside
in, but not the city.
In this paper, we use the location provided by Crim-
son Hexagon, which uses two methodologies. First, it
extracts the geotagged locations, which is only avail-
able in a small portion of the Twitter data. For the
tweets which are not geotagged, Crimson Hexagon es-
timates the users’ countries, regions, and cities based
on “various pieces of contextual information”, for ex-
ample, their profile information as well as users’ time
zones and languages. Using the country and state infor-
mation provided by Crimson Hexagon, this dataset has
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over 9 Million tweets with country location. More than
7.5 million of these geolocated tweets come from the
US, with the UK, Nigeria, and Russia trailing behind
the US with 287k, 277k, and 192k tweets respectively.
There are more than 4.7 Million US tweets with State
information provided. The top four states are as ex-
pected: California, Texas, New York, and Florida with
742k, 580k, 383k, and 360k tweets.
4 Results
Let us address the three research questions we sketched
earlier:
RQ1 What is the role of the users’ political ideology?
RQ2 How central are trolls and the users who retweet
them, spreaders?
RQ3 What is the role of social bots?
RQ4 Did trolls especially succeed in specific areas of the
US?
In Section 4.1, we analyze how political ideology af-
fects engagement with content posted by Russian trolls.
Section 4.2 shows how the position of trolls and spread-
ers evolve over time in the retweet network. Section 4.3
focuses on social bots and how they contribute to the
spreading of content produced by Russian trolls. Fi-
nally, in Section 4.4 we show how users contribute to
the consumption and the propagation of trolls’ content
based on their location.
4.1 RQ1: Political Ideology
The label propagation method succeeds in labeling most
of the users as either liberal or conservative; however,
the algorithm was not able to label some users outside
of the giant component. Table 6 shows the number of
trolls by ideology, and we can see that there are almost
double the amount of conservative trolls compared to
liberal ones in terms of number of trolls overall and the
number of trolls who wrote original tweets. Although
the number of liberal trolls is twice smaller, they pro-
duce more tweets than conservative trolls.
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics of spreaders.
The table shows that only few spreaders wrote origi-
nal tweets and that more than half of the tweets are
retweets of trolls. There are fewer conservative spread-
ers, but they write substantially more tweets than their
liberal counterparts (see Table 8). Besides talking about
the candidates, liberals talk about being black, women,
and school shootings. Conservatives talk about being
American, Obama, terrorism, refugees, and Muslims
(see Table 9 for top 20 words used for liberals and con-
servatives).
Table 6 Breakdown of the Russian trolls by political ideol-
ogy, with the ratio of conservative to liberal trolls.
Liberal Conservative Ratio
# of trolls 339 688 2
# of trolls w/ original tweets 306 608 1.98
# of original tweets 299,464 215,617 0.7
Table 7 Descriptive statistics of spreaders, i.e., users who
retweeted Russian trolls.
Value
# of spreaders 720,558
# of times retweeted trolls 3,540,717
# of spreaders with original tweets 21,338
# of original tweets 319,565
# of original tweets and retweets 7,357,717
Table 8 All spreaders by political ideology; Bot analysis for
115,396 spreaders (out of a 200k random sample of spreaders).
Ratio: conservative/liberal
Liberal Conservative Ratio
# of spreaders 446,979 273,546 0.6
# of tweets 1,715,696 5,641,988 3.2
# of bots 3,528 4,896 1.4
# of tweets by bots 26,233 181,604 7
Table 9 Top 20 meaningful lemmatized words from the
tweets of Russians trolls classified as Conservative and Liberal
Conservative count Liberal Count
trump 10,362 police 15,498
hillary 5,494 trump 13,999
people 4,479 man 13,118
clinton 4,295 black 9,942
obama 2,593 year 8,627
one 2,447 state 7,895
american 2,388 woman 7,748
woman 2,167 shooting 6,564
day 2,152 killed 6,407
donald 2,148 people 5,913
time 2,105 clinton 5,606
refugee 2,103 school 5,143
president 2,079 shot 5,132
terrorist 1,994 city 4,754
country 1,980 win 4,543
muslim 1,963 cop 4,515
year 1,893 day 4,478
need 1,856 fire 4,408
think 1,835 officer 4,397
al 1,823 death 4,305
4.2 RQ2: Temporal Analysis
Analyzing the influence of trolls across time is one of
the most important questions in terms of the spread
of political propaganda. The way we measure the influ-
ence of trolls is by measuring where they are located
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in the retweet network. We choose the retweet network
in particular because retweeting is the main vehicle for
spreading information on Twitter. In terms of the lo-
cation of the user, there are multiple ways to measure
the location of a user in the network he/she is embed-
ded in. We choose the k-core decomposition technique,
because it captures the notion of who is in the core of
the network vs. the periphery, while giving an ordinal
measure reflecting the number of connections.
The k-core of a graph is the maximal subgraph in
which every node has at least degree k. In a directed
network, k is the sum of in-degree + out-degree. The
k-core decomposition is a recursive approach that pro-
gressively trims the least connected nodes in a network
(those with lower degree) in order to identify the most
central ones Barbera´ et al. (2015).
We measure the centrality of trolls across time by
dividing the number of trolls by the total number of
nodes in every core for every snapshot of the network.
Since we want to measure the evolution of the trolls’
importance, we construct monthly retweet networks,
where every network contains all the previous nodes
and edges up to the time in question. The first snapshot
of the network contains the nodes and edges observed
until one month after the initialization of the data col-
lection, while the last snapshot includes all nodes and
edges in the retweet network.
Figure 3 (left side) shows that trolls make up a sub-
stantial portion of the lower cores and remain fairly
stable across time. We replicate the analysis for spread-
ers on figure 3 (right-side), which shows that spreaders’
centrality increases progressively across time and dom-
inates the core of the network toward the end.
4.3 RQ3: Social Bots
Since there are many spreaders in this dataset, we take
a random sample of 200,000 spreaders and use the ap-
proach explained in Section 3.3 to obtain bot scores. We
use Botometer to obtain bot scores only for the sample
and not for all of the spreaders, since it takes consid-
erably a long time to get bot scores for such a number
due to the Twitter API call limit. We are able to ob-
tain bot scores for 115,396 spreaders out of the 200,000
spreaders.
The number of users that have bot scores above 0.5,
and can therefore be safely considered bots according
to prior work Varol et al. (2017b), stands at 8,424 ac-
counts. Out of the 115,396 spreaders with bot scores,
68,057 are liberal, and 3,528 of them have bot scores
above 0.5, about 5% of the total. As for the conserva-
tives, there are 45,807 spreaders, 4,896 of which have
bot scores greater than 0.5, representing around 11% of
the total. As the Results summarized in Table 8 show,
although the number of conservative spreaders is lower
than liberal ones, there are more bots among conserva-
tives who write considerably more tweets.
Figure 4 shows the probability density of bot scores
of the liberal and conservative spreaders. Again, putting
aside the disproportionate number of liberals to conser-
vatives, the mean value of the bot scores of the conser-
vative spreaders (0.29) is higher than the liberal one
(0.18). We performed a two-sided t-test for the null hy-
pothesis that the two distributions have identical mean
values, and the p-value is less than 0.0, meaning that
we can reject the null.
For the plots in Figure 5, it is evident that con-
servative spreaders have higher means on all of the
Botometer subclass scores in comparison to their lib-
eral counterparts. The differences in all plots are sta-
tistically significant (p <0.001). Besides, looking at the
distributions, we can see that the differences in user
characteristics (metadata) and “Friend” category are
substantively different (around 0.10 difference).
4.4 RQ4: Geospatial Analysis
Figure 6 shows the proportion of the number of retweets
by liberal and conservative users (classified according
to the label propagation algorithm) of the content pro-
duced by Russian trolls per each state normalized per
state by the total number of liberal and conservative
tweets respectively. The ratio ρ is computed as ρ =
(TS/PS), where TS is the total number of liberal/conservative
retweets of liberal/conservative trolls from a given state
S, and PS is the total number of tweets per each State.
We notice that few states exhibit very high propor-
tions of retweets per total number of tweets for liberals
and conservatives. We test the deviations using a two-
tailed t-test on the z-scores of each deviation calculated
on the distribution of ratios. For conservatives, the av-
erage is 0.34 and the standard deviation is 0.12, while
for liberal states, the average is 0.26 and the standard
deviation is 0.13. For conservatives, Wyoming leads the
ranking (ρ=3.65, p-value = 0.001). For liberals, Mon-
tana (ρ=0.54, p-value = 0.023) and Kansas (ρ=0.51, p-
value = 0.046) lead the ranking and are the only states
with ratios that are statistically significant. It is also in-
teresting to note that a little less than 1/2 of the trolls
have Russia as their location while a small number of
spreaders and other users have Russia as their location
(see Table 10).
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Fig. 3 Temporal K-Core plots for trolls (left) and spreaders (right); the z-axis show the fraction of trolls/spreaders over the
total per k-core for each month in the retweet network. For each month, the graph contains all nodes and edges from all
previous months; in other words, the temporal graphs are additive in terms of nodes and edges.
Fig. 4 Overall Bot Score
Table 10 Users that reported Russia as their location
Count
# of trolls from Russia 438
# of spreaders from Russia 1,980
# of overall from Russia 3,017
5 Conclusions
The dissemination of information and the mechanisms
for democratic discussion have radically changed since
the advent of digital media, especially social media.
Platforms like Twitter are praised for their contribution
to democratization of public discourse on civic and po-
litical issues. However, many studies highlight the per-
ils associated with the abuse of these platforms. The
spread of deceptive, false and misleading information
aimed at manipulating public opinion are among those
risks.
In this work, we investigated the role and effects
of trolls, using the content produced by Russian trolls
on Twitter as a proxy for propaganda. We collected
tweets posted during the year of 2016 by Russian trolls,
spreaders, and other users who tweet in this period. We
showed that propaganda (produced by Russian trolls)
is shared more widely by conservatives than liberals on
Twitter. Although the number of liberal spreaders is
close to 2:1 in comparison to conservative ones, the lat-
ter write about 3.2 times as many tweets as the liberal
spreaders. Using state-of-the-art bot detection method,
we estimated that about 5% and 11% of the liberal and
conservative users are bots. Conservative bot spreaders
produce about 7 times as many tweets as liberal ones.
The spread of propaganda by malicious actors can
have severe negative consequences. It can enhance ma-
licious information and polarize political conversation,
causing confusion and social instability. Scientists are
currently investigating the consequences of such phe-
nomena Shorey and Howard (2016); Woolley and Howard
(2016). We plan to explore in detail the issue of how ma-
licious information spread via exposure and the role of
peer effect. Concluding, it is important to stress that,
although our analysis unveiled the current state of the
political debate and agenda pushed by the Russian trolls
who spread malicious information, it is impossible to
account for all the malicious efforts aimed at manipu-
lation during the last presidential election. State- and
non-state actors, local and foreign governments, politi-
cal parties, private organizations, and even individuals
with adequate resources Kollanyi et al. (2016), could
obtain operational capabilities and technical tools to
construct propaganda campaigns and deploy armies of
social bots to affect the directions of online conversa-
tions. Future efforts will be required by the social and
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Fig. 5 Bot Scores by sub-category
Fig. 6 Proportion of the number of retweets by conservative users of Russian trolls per each state normalized by the total
number of conservative tweets by state(right); equivalent map for liberals on the left.
computational science communities to study this issue
in depth and develop more sophisticated detection tech-
niques capable of unmasking and fighting these mali-
cious efforts.
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